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1. Toward a Polyphonic View of Cultural Identity
In this paper I will use the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony, 1
of a choral dialogue of multiple and heterogeneous voices, to
elaborate a pluralistic account of cultural identity in general and

of Hispanic identity in particular. I will complicate and further
pluralize the Bakhtinian notion by talking about the overlapping
and criss-crossing dialogues of heterogeneous voices that go
into the formation of cultural identities. My pluralistic view
emphasizes that cultural identity is bound up with differences
and opposes those homogeneous models that try to irnpose a
unique articulation of collective identity on the members of a
group. Although I will not explicitly discuss the cornplex relations
between cultural identity and racial and ethnic identity/ my
pluralistic view underscores that racial and ethnic elements are
crucial components of cultural identity and of its heterogeneous
nature; and I oppose those contemporary views that talk about
"post-ethnic" and "post-racial" identities, trying to purify individual
and collective identities of racial and ethnic meanings.'
Cultural differences are everywhere. l11ere is no way around
this omnipresent cultural heterogeneity in the 21st century. It has
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become clear that the globalized world of today is a pluri-verse,
rather than a uni-verse, and that multiculturalism is not simply
the exotic peculiarity of some post-colonial societies, but the
inescapable predicament of the contemporary world commu nity.
But even multicultural views of today's world and its comm unities
are often not pluralistic enough because they frequently assume
a homogeneous view of the participating cultural identities, as
if each of them had a unique voice and could make only one
unique contribution to the multicultural dialogue. It will be my
contention that not only multicultural societies are polyphonic,
but each cultural group (no matter how homogeneous it may
appear to be) contains a plurality of voices. Cultures speak in
many voices.4 They are heterogeneous through and through.

Differences and heterogen eity go all the way down to the very
core of a cultural identity. So we need an account that can make
sense of identity through differences, not in spite of them.
Through the notion of polyphony I will try to articulate
a pluralistic perspective that can shed light on how cultural
identities are formed, sustained, and transformed, as well as on
how they interact with one another in cross-cultu ral dialogues.
A philosophical elucidation of polyphonic dialogues within
and across cultu res is now needed more than ever. For cultural
differences have come under suspicion and the appreciation of
their positive significance has become a difficult challenge. The
radical pluralism I articulate and defe nd in this paper highlights
the positive contributions of cultural diversity and the dangers
of trying to repress it, tame it, constrain it, or make it fit in fixed
molds and restricted spaces. As it will become clear in the last
section when I apply my pluralistic approach to situated Hispanic
identities in particular cultural contexts, the goal of my polyphonic
view is to facilitate playful and diverse forms of identification
and to open up sites for disidentifica tion,5 calling attention to
alternative cultural spaces in which different (non-conforming)
identities-distanced from mainstream culture--ca n flourish.
In the next section I will articulate my pluralistic view by
elaborating central in sights that I d raw from Wittgen stein's
philosophy of language and philosophy of culture. 1 will further
develop my polyphonic pluralism in the third and fin al section by
elu �idating the linguistic and cultural practices of Hispanics in

particularly challenging contexts: Chicanos living by the Mexico-
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U SA border, en Ia frontera; and margi nalized groups living i n
urban ghettos i n Mexico City.
2. Wittgenstein and the Hispanic family
In this section I try to determine what the contemporary
phi losophical debate about Hispanic identity can learn from the
histori cal, practical, and normative contextualism that i nforms
Wittgenstei n's later phi losophy. I argue that from Wittgenstein's
notion of family resemblance we can derive a non-essenti alist
and p luralistic view of cu ltura l identity as somethi ng that is
historica l ly situated, action-based, and value-laden. So the
three crucial i ngredients of my Wittgensteinian fami lial view of
cu ltura l identity are historicity, agency, and normativity. On my
view, cu ltura l identity is produced and mai ntai ned by historical
practices; secondly, it is crucially dependent on the agency of its
members and also on the agency of those with whom they i nteract;
and finally, a cu ltural identity has a normative di mension, that
is, membershi p i n the cu ltura l group is i nformed by normative
attitudes (attitudes that may be quite heterogeneous and often
remain implicit). I develop my Wittgensteinian fami lial view of
Hispanic identity i n two stages. I n the first stage I offer a critical
examination of Jorge G racia's fami lial account. There I argue that
G racia's account is not Wittgensteinian enough and I criticize its
metaphysical presuppositions from a Wittgensteinian perspective.
In the second and more positive stage of my argument I develop
my own polyphonic i nterpretation of the notion of fami ly
resemblance and apply it to Hispanic i dentity.
2a. Gracia's Familial View: History without Agency
and Normativity.
I n Hispanic/Latina Identity Gracia (2000) argues that
the col lective i dentity of Hispanics should be understood as
the identity of a historical family formed by "a unique web of
changi ng historical relations." (p. 49) On thi s fami lial-historical
view, the u nity of H ispanics is not a unity of commonality, but
a unity of community, "a historical unity founded on relations."
(p. 5 0) Accord i ng to G racia, the origi n of the comp lex h istory
that unites "our Hispanic fam i ly" i s "the encounter" of Iberi a
and America i n 1 492. G racia argues that the term "Hispanic" i s
the only appropriate name for our historical fami ly because it
3

Ethnic Studies Review Volume 29

is the only label that can bring together all those Iberians and
Americans who have come to share a cultural identity as a result
of historical events. Rather than discussing the validity of these
specific contentious claims, I want to discuss instead the general
strengths and weaknesses of Gracia's familial view.
The main strength of Gracia's familial-historical view is its
capacity to account for change and diversity as fundamental
aspects of Hispanic identity. On Gracia's view the cultural identity
of a group is neither static nor homogeneous. On the one hand,
Gracia's diachronic view depicts Hispanic identity as something
dynamic that is always in the making and can never be fixed
once and for all. This picture brings to the fore the contingencies
of the past that have contributed to the formation of our Hispanic
identity; and it underscores that the future of our Hispanic family
remains open: "The future is always open and can be different.
We are not trapped in our identity." (p. 190) On the other hand,
Gracia's familial-historical view emphasizes the heterogeneous
character of Hispanic identity: Hispanics share only "family
resemblances" and their identity "is bound up with difference."
(p. 33) Gracia's familial analysis shows that the homogeneity
of group identity is a myth, for families are not homogeneous
wholes composed of pure elements: "They include contradictory
elements and involve mixing. Indeed, contradiction and mixing
seems to be of the essence, for a living unity is impossible without
contradiction and heterogeneity." (p.SO) This is particularly true of
our Hispanic family that has been constituted through mixing or
mestizaje at all levels.

Despite its unquestionable virtues, Gracia's familial-historical
view has also some weaknesses. A critical look at the externalist
and realist view of history that animates Gracia's account of
Hispanic identity can help to uncover some of its problematic
assumptions. In the first place, it is highly questionable that
what gives unity to our Hispanic family is history per se and not
the appropriation of that history in and through our practices.
However, Gracia's externalist view of history forces him to this
implausible conclusion: "What ties [a group of people] together,
and separates them from others, is history and the particular events
of that history rather than the consciousness of that history." (p.

49) But it is far from clear that having a distinctive history is a
sufficient condition for collective identity. This externalist claim
4
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belies the fundamental practical dimension of cultural identity,
which involves agency and is not something that simply happens
to us as a result of history.ll1e explicit recognition of this practical
aspect of Hispanic identity is essential for the self-empowerment
of the group.
In the second place, Gracia's familial-historical view shares
with essentialist views the ambition of finding a metaphysical
grounding for Hispanic identity that is independent of politiGll
viewpoints. However, it seems implausible that history can
provide such value-free grounding. Gracia insists that our
philosophical justifications of claims about Hispanic identity
"should not be based on politics, but on historical fact." (p. 67)
But unless a strong fac.
.
llvalue distinction is invoked, it is not at
all clear that history and politics can be kept separate. Gracia
seems to be reacting against accounts that have explicitly tied
Hispanic/Latina identity to particular social and political agendas
such as li!Jeration.6 Although Gracia acknowledges the crucial
importance of the project of liberation in Latin America, he does
not think that liberation should be considered as a constitutive
element of Hispanicity, for the idea of liberation has not played
the same key role everywhere in the Hispanic world and it is not
clear that it will in the future.ll1is is indeed true, but it should not
be a problem for a philosophical account of Hispanic identity
that is developed for our here and now rather than for all times
and all places. And this brings us to the unWittgenstenian aspect
of Gracia's view. just as the traditional essentialist views, Gracia's
familial-historical view purports to be .1 universal theory of Hispanic
identity that is independent of specific contexts. By contrast,
Wittgenstein encouraged us to look at specific cases for specific
purposes. On Wittgenstein's view, the job of the philosopher
is to arrange descriptions or "perspicuous representations" (PI
§122), that is, to provide elucidations by situating things in their
historical, practical, and normative contexts. And it is of the
utmost importance that these descriptions or elucidations are
produced for "particular practical purposes" (PI § 132). However,
the philosophical standpoint adopted and encouraged by Gracia's
view is not the situated perspective of an engaged critic, but the
detached perspective of an observer who looks at the history of
our Hispanic family sub specie aetemitatis.ll1is lack of sensitivity
to practical and normative contexts is damaging, for it undermines
5
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the critica l and transformative potenti al that a phi l osophica l
e luci dati on of Hispanic identity should have.
In my opi nion, Gracia's fami lia l-h i storical view of Hispanic
identity is an important step in the right di rection, but a step
that cou ld have taken us much fu rther if it had acknowledged
the practi ca l and normative dimensions of identity. An adequate
familial account of identity needs to pay c loser attention to the
role of agency and va l ues in the formation of identity. Gracia's
view ca lls attention to one of the three crucial features of cu ltural
identity-i .e. historicity, but disregards the other two-i .e. agency
and normativity. However, these features ca nnot be separated
without di stortion. As I wi l l argue in what fo llows, the hi storicity of
a cultural group or family is essenti a l ly practica l and nonnative.

2b. Polyphonic Families: Families with Histories,
Practices, and Norms.
One of the lessons we can learn from Wittgenstein's later
phi losophy is that most of the concepts we use to descri be
ourselves and the world around us are not applied according to
fixed criteria of strict identity. When we use a concept such as
"game" or "chair", we treat all ki nds of different thi ngs as the
same although they are not strictly identica l i n any respect. That
is, in our categori zations different thi ngs are treated as i nstances
of the same category even though there is no feature (or set of
features) that they a l l have in com mon : many different ki nds of
activities are cal led games and many different ki nds of artifacts
are cal led chai rs; and we can always add new items to the list of
thi ngs that fa ll u nder these concepts (we can a lways i nvent new
ki nds of games and produce new ki nds of chairs). Wittgenstei n
suggested that these concepts are like families, whose members
resemble one another i n many different ways: some may have
simi lar hai r, others a simi lar nose, others may share a parti cu l ar
way of talki ng, or a simi lar laughter, etc. Fami li es a re composed
of heterogeneous elements. There i s noth ing i n particu lar that a l l
their members must have: they si mply exhibit some s i m i larities;
they share certai n "fam i ly resemblances", but there is no fixed
set of necessary and sufficient conditi ons that determi ne fami lial
membership. As Wittgestei n puts it, what bri ngs together and
keeps together the members of those categories that function l i ke
fami lies is "a complicated network of simi larities overlappi ng
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and criss-crossi ng." (PI §66) Wittgestei n's analogy between the
strength of a concept and the strength of a thread i l lustrates this
poi nt: "we extend our concept [ . . . ] as in spi n n i ng a thread we
twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside
in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but
in the overlappi ng of many fibres." ( PI §67)
As I have argued elsewhere/ the fami l ial identity of the
members of a group is cruci ally dependent on overlappi ng
s i m i larities, but it is also doubly dependent on i ntersecti ng
differences: differences with members of other groups that are
considered promi nent, and differences among the members of
the group that are consi dered negligi ble. In other words, the
network of s i m i l arities i n which fami lial identity consists must be
accompanied by two distinct networks of overlapping and criss
crossing differences: one network of differences that sets apart
the members of the fami ly from the members of other fami li es;
and another network composed of those differences among the
members of the fam i l y themselves that lurk in the background
and are disregarded for the sake of fam i l ia l identity. It is important
to note that the relationship that holds between these networks is
a dynamic one: differences that today set apart one fami ly from
another may become i nconsequenti a l tomorrow; and, on the
other hand, i nternal differences that are considered negligi ble
today may grow to be important differences tomorrow, even to the
poi nt of excludi ng i ndividuals from membership in the fami ly. At
the same ti me, these dynamic fluctuations between the networks
of differences correspond to transformations i n the network of
s i m i larities that sustai ns fam i lial identity, for a l l these networks
are mutua l ly dependent and they are shaped simu ltaneously.
A fam i ly is a living unit whose members come and go; and,
therefore, a fam i l i a l i dentity i s always subject to change and must
be left open. Moreover, even when the membershi p i n the fami l y
remai ns the same, the relations among the members of the fami ly
(as wel l as thei r relations with other fami lies) change as differences
become visible and fam i ly ties are relaxed. It is i mportant to note
that these networks of si mi larities and differences that become
i ndicative of fami lial identity have a history: they resu lt from
the conti nued use of certai n associations, that i s, from treati ng
thi ngs in a particular way in our practi ces. These networks of
simi larities and differences acqui re diagnostic va lue simply
7
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because of the (criteria!) significance they have been given i n our
practices, because they have come to be seen as symptoms of
membership in a group. But those simi larities and differences-as
wel l as their diagnostic value for cu ltural affi liation-are always
open to contestation (even if they do not face chal lenges and
criticisms here and now); and claims about which simi larities and
di fferences can be sai d to be constitutive of the cu ltu ra l i dentity
of a group are always defeasible (even if not yet defeated). In my
view, the networks of simi larities and differences that have become
symptomatic of fam i l ial i dentity ca l l for a genealogical account,
that is, a genealogy of thei r formation through the shared ways of
speaki ng and acting enforced by cu ltura l practices (typically the
dominant or mai nstream practices with i n the cu lture).
This fam i l ial view of i dentity based on Wittgenstein's
account of categori zation makes clear that the homogeneity and
fixity of cultu ra l i dentities are nothing but myths. Identity shou ld
be thought of as somethi ng heterogeneous and fluid. Given the
flu i d heterogeneity of fami lial i dentity, it is not surpri sing that all
attempts to reduce the shared i dentity of Hispanics to common
properties fai I. These fai lures have led many to conclude that we
should give up Hi spanic i dentity and retreat to nati onal i dentities
(Mexican i dentity, Cuban i dentity, Argenti nean i dentity, etc.). But,
as it turns out, these col lective i dentities pose the same problems
(there is no fixed set of features shared by a l l Mexi cans, a l l Cubans,
a l l Argenti neans, etc). The lesson to learn here is that we shou ld
reject the essenti alist assumption that a shared identity must be
based on common features. The unity of Hispanics cannot be
established at the expense of diversity, but on the basis of it. As
Gracia puts it, the un ity of Hispanics is "a unity in diversity" (p. 49);
that is, it i s not a u nity of commona lity, but a unity of community:
the unity of a family.8 This is a polyphonic unity: fam i l ies are
i ntri nsica l ly polyphonic because they contain a m u lti p l i city of
voi ces, standpoints, and perspectives. And the polyphony of a
family is essenti ally dynamic: it i s a living polyphony that cannot
be ful ly control led or tamed; in parti cu lar, it can not be forced
to conform to an exhaustive cata logue of admissi ble fam i l i al
voices and perspectives, for what these are cannot be decided
i n advance, prior to the contingent histori cal development of the
fami ly.
My fam i l i al-historica l view ca l ls attention to the contingencies
8
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of the past that have contributed to the formation of our Hispanic
identity; and it underscores that the future of our identity
remains open and therefore presents us with a task for which we
have to take responsibility. According to this view, identifying
oneself as Hispanic (o r as a member of any other group) is the
expression of a commitment: a com mitment to one's history, to a
set of ongoing pra ctices, and to a com mon future. Wh at is most
distinctive about cultural identity is that it involves normative
attitudes that inform one's interests, values, and practices. What
cha racterizes membership in a cultural group is a relation of
normative identification, which is precisely what the meta phor

of the fa mily captures so well. Being part of a culture involves
being com mitted to it; that is, it involves seeing oneself as part of
that community or fa mily, no m atter how different its members
a re and how heterogeneous their practices and values can be.
TI1is is a formal commitm ent with no specific or fixed content.
TI1ere is no list of values that we a re asked to sign on to in order
to become a member of the Hispanic fa mily. But the formal
commitment that is involved in the norm ative identification with
a group creates a bond with the members of the group. TI1is bond,
which brings together the members of the group as a collectivity,
is established and maintained th rough the commitment to a
shared and coordinated agency that faces com mon problems and
a common future-a commitment that is not affected by the fact
that the members of the group will inevitably disagree about what
their problems a re and what their future sh ould look like. TI1e
specific contents that our fa milial commitments happen to take
will be determined historically th rough the collective agency and
ongoing negotiations of the members of the group .
As G racia saw, history produces cultural communities or
families. But history is not something that simply happens to us .
We make history (and remake it or reconstruct it). Of course this

does not mean that we m ake it up.9 We don't simply invent histo ry,
but we const ruct it th rough our agency, individual and collective,
conscious and unconscious . TI1e crucial point here is that to
be a member of a cultural group or family is to be com mitted
to pa rticipate in the collective agency of the group and in the
endless process of negotiation in which their values and interests
get articulated and discussed. These ongoing negotiations involve
a double dialogue: a dialogue among the members of the group
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and a dialogue of the group (and its members) with other groups
(and their members) . To these complex polyph onic dialogues I
now turn.

3. Tongues Untied: Polyphonic Dialogues and the
Cultural Agency of Hispanics In Particular Contexts
The formation of a cultural identity requires an intra-cultural
dialogue of an open plurality of voices (as many as possible).
Through this dialogue the members of a culture can produce a
multi-vocal articulation of their multiple problems, needs, values,
ideals, and illusions. But this dialogue needs to be su pplemented
with another one that goes beyond the members of the group. For,
indeed, no group-no matter how powerful or hegemonic-can
fully comprehend the problems it faces and fully determine its
own future indepen dently of other groups. So a n inter-cultural
dialogue between the cultural group in question and other groups
with which its existence is entangled is also necessary.
We need to keep cultural dialogues as open as possible,
without constraining and disciplining their constitutive diversity,
that is, the plurality and heterogeneity of their voices. In other
words, we need to keep our dialogues polyphonic. We have to be
prepared to fight homogenizing tendencies that erase differences
as well as normalizing tendencies that make certain articulations
of identity mainstream and relegate other identity formations
to the margins. We must resist the vain and dangerous attempt
to tame the in domitable polyphony of intra- and inter-cultural
dialogues. Coercive social and cultural forces and institutions
(from school to the family and the media) are responsible for the
homogenization of mainstream identities and the marginalization
of those identities that don't conform to social expectations and
established social norms. These coercive forces-which can come
from inside one's own group or community as well as from other
social units-limit the self-expression of individuals and groups as
they navigate through intra-cultural and inter-cultural dialogues.
They often restrict, handicap, and even preclude the emergence
and development of alternative identities that can be subversive
and transformative, for they weave the networks of similarities
and differences that support relations of identification in new
and alternative ways. A crucial part of this social and cultural
process of disciplining identities and taming their polyphony
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is the attempt to subdue and domesticate new languages and
dialects that people develop to express thei r experiences, ideals,
values, needs, i nterests, etc. These new li nguistic formations (new
language-games) can faci litate the rearticu lation or reconstruction
of established groups or fami lies and the creation of new ones.
Therefore, keeping cu ltu ral dialogues open and guaranteei ng the
flou rishi ng of polyphonic identities requi res resisti ng the tam i ng
of one's tongue.
Of specia l i nterest in this respect are the frontier identities and
border languages that trouble cu ltu ra l dialogues by underscori ng
their i ndomitable diversity and the complex dialectic between
i ntra-fami lial and i nter-fami lial relations. These are the languages
and identities of those who live at the l i mits or borders between
communities-en /a frontera-and often have multiple fam i l i a l
affi liations, belongi ng to different cu ltura l groups or fami lies
simu ltaneously.1° Frontier identities and border l anguages have
recently received special attention i n the literature, especial ly i n
the pioneer work of G loria Anzaldua. I n Borderlands!La Frontera
Anzaldua tel ls us that at the core of her Chicana identity is a
cu ltura l duplicity that makes her a stranger even to the members
of her own fam i ly, let alone to those of other fam i l i es, to whom
she appears as fu l ly foreign and even deviant. Those who have
frontier identities often display signs of cu ltura l otherness i n their
faces and bodies, in their manners and comportment, and i n their
speech.lhese are signs that often come under attack, bei ng subject
to the domesticati ng social and cu ltural forces that conspire to
erase them. Our bodies and habits are disci pli ned; our tongues
are tamed. In this respect, Anzaldua talks about the concerted
efforts "to get rid of our accents", which she describes as a violent
attack on one's identity and basic rights: "Attacks on one's form
of expression with the i ntent to censor a re a violation of the Fi rst
Amendment. El Anglo con cara de inocente nos arranc6/a lengua.
Wi ld tongues can't be tamed, they can on ly be cut out." (p. 76)
It is important to note that the efforts to tame one's tongue
do not come only from outside one's group or fami ly. Anzaldua
poignantly remarks that her Chicana tongue is not only tamed
-and u lti mately "cut out"-by the Anglos, but a lso by other
Hispanics. Chicano Spanish is not recogni zed and respected
by many other Spanish speakers: " Even our own peop le, other
Spanish speakers, nos quieren poner candados en Ia boca. [ ]
. . .
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Chicano Spanish is considered by the purist and by �ost Lati nos
deficient, a muti lation of Spanish ." (pp. 76-77) And th1s scorn and
disci p l i n i ng efforts come not j ust from other Spanish s� eakers, but
.
from Chi canas and Chi canos themselves, who have mte rnahzed
the alleged inferiority of their language and, u lti mately, of their
i dentity. "Chicanas who grew up speaki ng Chicano Spanish have
i nternal ized the bel ief that we speak poor Spanish [ . . . ] we use our
language differences agai nst each other." (p. 80) Thus Chi canos
are left speaking "an orphan tongue":
Deslenguadas. Somos las del espaiiol deficiente. We
are your li nguistic nightmare, your l i nguistic aberration,
your li nguistic mestisaje, the subject of your bur/a. Be
cause we speak with tongues of fire we are cultura l ly
crucified. Raci al ly, cultural ly, and l i nguistica l ly somos
huerfanos-we speak an orphan tongue. (Anza ldua
1999, p. 80)
The domesticati on of a border language such as Chicano
Spanish leaves its speakers tongue-tied, speech less, i ndeed as if
their tongues had been cut out, for they are rendered unable to
express themselves in their own ways . The soci al stigmati zati on
and cu ltural orphanage of their forms of expression amount to the
margi nal ization of their very i dentities:11 "If a person, Chi cana or
Lati na, has a low esti mation of my native tongue, she has also a
low esti mation of me. [ . . . ] I am my language. Unti l I can take pri de
i n my language, I cannot take pride i n myself." (pp. 80-81) This
moment of self-empowerment through one's tongue is a moment
of cultural pride and cu ltural affirmation. It invo lves a demand
for cultural solidarity, for the formation of a proud l i nguisti c
community li berated from self-hatred, a community i n which the
margi nalized tongue fi nds a home and a fami ly and is no longer
orphan. Anzaldua makes this poi nt in very Wittgensteinian terms,
cal l i ng for the construction of a "We"--un 11Nosotras11-around
a common tongue that corresponds to a shared form of l i fe. She
writes: "Chi cano Spanish is a border tongue whi ch developed
natural ly. [ . . . ] Un language que corresponde a un modo de vivir.
Chi cano Spanish i s not incorrect, it is a living language. [ . . . ] for a
people who cannot entirely i dentify with either standard (formal,
Casti l l ian) Spanish nor sta ndard Engl ish, what recourse is left to
them but to create their own language? A language which they
can connect their identity to, one capable of communicati ng the
12
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real ities and values true to themselves." (p. 77)
As Anza ldua suggests, a common tongue that can express
people's "rea lities and values" makes possible the cu ltural
process of community formation arou nd a shared form of life.
Through a common tongue people can arti cu late their shared
experiences, prob lems, needs, i nterests, values, etc.; and thus
cu ltura l solidarity becomes possi ble. For this reason, Chicano
Spanish deserves recognition and respect from the members of the
Hispanic fam i ly as wel l from other cu ltu ra l groups. For this reason
also, we ought to acknowledge the special cu ltural productivity of
border tongues in general, for they make possib le the arti cu lation
of new experiences and new forms of identity, faci l itati ng the
diversification of cu ltural norms and cu ltura l expectations. The
task of cu ltural self-affirmation through language is a complex
and always ongoing task. It is extremely complex because it has
to be constantly diversified, maki ng sure that no voices are left
out.12 And it is also a never-ending task, for cu ltures and cu ltura l
identities are living thi ngs that are a lways changing.
Keeping tongues untied is a pressi ng task for which we are
a l l col lectivel y responsible, as i ndividuals and as communities.
But it is i ndeed not an easy task. In and th rough cu ltural dialogues
we need to secure recognition and respect for a l l but especially
for those who have been si lenced and may be left without a
voice, those whose experiences depart from normali zed cu ltural
expectations, those whose identities do not fit i nto the established
cu ltural molds avai I able to them. There are cu ltura l identities that
need a new language to express themselves and the creation of
a supportive community i n which to flouri sh, identities that
without special attention and care-are doomed to isolation and
si lence because they wi l l remain margi nalized and tongue-tied.
Keepi ng tongues untied, keeping cu ltural dialogues polyphon ic,
i nvolves a process of constant i nterrogation and cha l lenge, a
process of radical but immanent critique of our cu ltural practices
and the ways i n which they i nclude and exclude people th rough
the sedimentation of cu ltural simi larities and differences. We need
to destabi lize whatever cu ltural borders or frontiers are erected,
whatever relations of i nclusion and exclusion are established i n
the cu ltural landscape. Th i s critical activity of i nterrogation and
destabi lization of cu ltura l bou ndaries is epitomized in the work of
the Tij uana-based Chicano performance artist Gui l lermo Gomez13
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Pena. He aptly describes his performance art as "dangerous
broder-crossing" (2000) and as an exercise in "the semiotics of
the frontier" and "the epistemology of multiplicity" (2002). In
his performances Gomez-Pena parodies the attitudes towards
cultural differences that contribute to perpetuate oppression
and marginalization. In his recent work (2002) he develops a
performative critique of the objectivism of academic discourses
that treat cultural differences as mere objects of study. He turns
the tables on scientific observers, parodically mimicking their
objetivizing gaze, when he acts as "un antropo/oco fronterizo"
who crosses the borders in search for differences to add to the
catalogue of exotic behavior. In his performative rendering of
reverse anthropology, the "antropo/oco" Gomez-Pena captures
specimens of gringos who are displayed in cages, as trophies of
his cultural expedition, to an audience that is asked to form a
We--a community-whose identity is defined in opposition to
these cultural others.
Gomez-Pena's parodic

performances

also

contain

a

performative critique of the cultural exoticism that transforms
cultural differences into products of consumption. This
consumerist attitude toward differences is patent in cultural
tourism. In their cultural explorations tourists make a spectacle
of cultural differences ("the spectacularization of the bizarre");
and the more distant the cultural differences encountered, the
bigger the thri II and the more reassured the tourists wi II feel about
their own ways upon return from their trip. This cultural exoticism
also trivializes otherness through the commodification of cultural
differences that can be found in fashion and pop culture: "the
young hipsters of the 90s have selectively borrowed elements
from numerous third world 'pet cultures', to create their own
designer tribalism." (2000, p. 272) This cultural consumerism
results in the normalization of cultural differences and the creation
of "alternative mainstreams". As Gomez-Pena puts it, the legacy
of the 1990s is "that the insatiable and undifferentiated mass of
the so-called 'mainstream' has finally devoured all margins, and
the more dangerous, 'other', and exotic these margins, the better.
In fact, stricto sensu, we can say that there are no margins left.
'Alternative' thought, fringe subcultures, and so-called radical
behavior have actually become THE mainstream." (Ibid.)
Our challenge in the 21st century is to recognize and respect
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cu ltura l differences without exoticizi ng them or commodifyi ng
them, without contributi ng to their margi nalization or assimi lati ng
them to the mainstream . This cha l lenge ca l ls for the troubl i ng of the
relation between center and peri phery, for the i nterrogation of the
boundaries that separate cu ltural centers from cu ltural margi ns.
Gomez-Pena's performances often i nvolve a subversive violation
of cu ltural expectations that i nvites the critica l questioning and
problematization of cu ltura l boundaries. But it is i mportant to note
that we don't need physica l and geographical borders to engage
i n the transgression of cu ltural boundaries and soci a l norms.
Cu ltura l boundaries and the differences and exclusions they
i nstitute exist even when there are no visible frontiers. And the
critical i nterrogation of these boundaries shou ld not be left only
to performance artists and "professionals" of cu ltura l otherness
such as Gomez-Pena. A l l of us, i n our own everyday activities
and performances as cu ltural agents, shou ld contri bute to the
critical questioni ng, reconstruction, and rearti cu lation of cu ltural
boundaries. Creative and reconstructive "border-crossi ng" can
take place within any given community and cu ltu ra l landscape,
even at what is considered the very core or center of the fami lial
group i n question and its "homeland" or native cultural space. This
productive "border-crossi ng" can take place even if the physi cal
and geographica l borders are not with i n sight, for i ndeed there
are more frontiers than the visible ones-there are borders, very
rea l borders (even if they are not physica l and visible) whenever
there are relations of i nclusion and exclusion.
An example of cu ltura l "border-crossi ng" that takes p lace
far from (and i ndependently of) physical borders can be found
in the unorthodox rel igious practices of margi nalized groups i n
the u rban ghettos of Mexico City. These i nclude the practices of
worshipi ng Santa Muerte, a rel igious icon that " looks l i ke hel l : a
scythe-wielding skeleton with a blood-curd l i ng gri n" (as reported
by The New York Ttmes, March 26, 2004, A4). Th i s vision of hel l
attracts those who come from p laces that feel l i ke hel l o n earth,
i n ner-city neighborhoods such as Tepito, a cri me-ravaged slum i n
the heart of Mexico City. Santa Muerte is "an angel of last resort
for outlaws and outcasts" (Ibid.). Her fol lowers are people who
live on the fringes of society, peop le who have been abandoned
by thei r government and disparaged by thei r church: prostitutes,
petty thieves, smugglers, drug dealers and addicts, and crimi nals
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of all sorts, who have been excluded from mainstream culture
and its practices, where their participation is deemed inadmissible
because of the way they speak, the way they dress, their manners
and habits, and indeed their lifesty le. They know they cannot go
to La Virgen de Guadalupe dressed like that, speaking like that,
living like that. And therefore they take their prayers and candle
offerings elsewhere, to Santa Muerte. Her worshipers say that they
adore Santa Muerte because she is their own creation and she is
like them: she is depicted as enjoying chocolates and jewelry,

cigarettes and whiskey. Santa Muerte has been created by the
people in their own image. This is where Santa Muerte's strong
popular appeal among Mexico's impoverished and neglected
masses lies. This religious icon has been constructed and is used
as a site of cultural identification that fil ls a void created by social
and cu ltural exclusions. As Hayde Sol fs Cirdenas-a street vendor
who sel ls smuggled sneakers in Tepito-is reported to have said,
La Virgen de Guadalupe "wou ld not sympathize with a life like
hers, tending rather to wel l -off people with col lege degrees and
nice clothes", but Santa Muerte "hears prayers from dark p l aces"
since "she was sent to rescue the lost, society's rejects" (Ibid.).
The Catho lic Church in Mexico has condemned Santa Muerte
services as devi I worship, and law enforcement authorities keep
a close eye on this cu lt, which they link to street violence and
delinquency. But this tout court condemnation and persecution
are problematic and socia l ly irresponsib le, for they sim p ly ignore
that these cu ltural practices fu lfil l a crucial social need for cu ltural
affirmation and collective self-expression. And the rejection
of new forms of cu ltural expression is especia lly worrisome
when it is issued from privileged places of power, and when it
targets the cu ltural agency and voices of people who have been
left out of accepted practices and institutions. It is too bad that
marginalized cu ltural practices such as those surrounding Santa
Muerte are rejected off hand by the mainstream, although this
is certain ly not sur prising, since the authorities and institutions
of mainstream cu lture have something at stake here, namely,
retaining their privileged and hegemonic status by maintaining
the established boundaries between acceptable and inadmissibl e
forms o f cultural expression. Of course, m y c laim is not that the
unorthodox religious practices surrounding Santa Muerte wil l
surely b e the path t o human f lourishing for the oppressed and
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margi nalized groups that parti cipate i n them. They may or may
not be. But my poi nt is simply that we must al low for a lternative
cu ltural practices l i ke these to articulate people's experiences and
to give cu ltura l expression to thei r i nterests, va lues, aspirations,
fears, goal s, ideals, and i l lusions . 1 3
M y polyphonic view contends that our cu ltural practices
should be open to a// possible voices. Now, it is important to
note that thi s notion of cu ltural openness welcomes all voices
but not all forms of symbolic interactions. For, i ndeed, there are
non-dialogical ways i n which voices can i nteract with other
voices so as to oppress them, to margi nalize them, and even to
si lence them or destroy them a ltogether. Polyphonic dialogues
can only contribute to cu ltura l openness if, without excluding
any voice (or set of voices) i n particu lar, they do everythi ng
they can to avoid symbolic i mpositions, margi nali zations, and
forms of si lenci ng (such as, for examp le, hate speech). It is not
at a l l clear that the best way to avert these dangers of symbolic
oppression i s prohibition. I n thi s sense, i n Excitable Speech (1 997)
Judith Butler has argued quite convi nci ngly that censorship is
not the best way of dea l i ng with the symbolic disempowerment
and si lenci ng that resu It from hate speech; and there are indeed
good reasons to believe that speech codes that simply prohibit
the use of certai n terms are not particu larly effective in the
fight agai nst symbolic oppression. Cu ltural openness is not
secured by legal mandates and prohibitions. Securi ng cu ltura l
open ness must i nvolve arrangi ng o u r symbolic practices (and the
di scursive contexts in which they take p lace) i n such a way that
any attempt to disempower or si lence voices is discouraged and
neutralized, maki ng it very difficult (perhaps even i mpossi ble)
for such attempts to succeed. But it wou ld be naive to thi nk that
we can create discursive practices and spaces that elimi nate
all possi b le forms of exclusion and si lenci ng. It wou ld also be
wrong to assume that the task is simply to identify those voices
that are exclusionary and antidemocratic (the si lenci ng voices
of racists, sexists, homophobes, etc), because voices are plastic
and dynamic:14 i nsofar as they are a live, they can change and are
therefore mov i ng targets that don't admit reification (they can be
cooperative and i nclusive here and now, and yet antagonistic and
exclusionary there and then).
We need to al low for alternative cu ltural spaces and
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alternative cu ltural practices. We have to make it possible for
people to deve lop their own ways of expressi ng themselves and
of articu lating thei r experiences, problems, i nterests, etc. We have
the i ndividual and col lective responsi bility to do everything we
can to keep cu ltural dialogues open and to al low for the identities
of groups and individuals to be polyphonic, that is, to contai n
a (diverse and heterogeneous) plurality of voices. We have to
keep tongues untied. We have to make our cu ltu ral dialogues
polyphoni c. Of course, open and polyphonic dia logues do not
guarantee cultural so lidarity, social j u stice, the mitigation of
oppression, and the flourishing of happier cu ltura l groups or
families. The achievement of these goa ls is never guaranteed.
But what untying tongues and having polyphon ic dialogues
can do is to increase the capacity that groups and i ndividuals
have to negotiate their pasts, presents, and futures, freely, so that
the conti ngent ach ievement of cu ltura l solidarity, soci al j u stice,
liberati on, and happi ness can come to depend (at least to some
degree) on their own agency.
When tongues are untied, we do not know what they wi I I
say, o r even i n what language they wi I I speak; but we know at
least this: that they wi l l be able to talk. "I wi l l have my voice [ . . ] .
I wi l l have my serpent's tongue-my woman's voice, my sexual
voice, my poet's voice. I wi l l overcome the tradition of si lence."
(An zaldua 1 999, p. 8 1 )
.

Notes
1

See Bakhti n (1 981 ).

2 I have done thi s in my (2004). For a fuller d i scussion of th i s i ssue as it
emerges in the d i scussion of H i span ic/Lati na identity, see Al coff (2000).
3

For example, in Post-eth n ic America Davi<l Hol l inger

(2000) argues for

the construction of an American identity without eth nic or racial mea n
ings. I have a rgued agai nst the post-eth nic view at length in my
See also Alcoff
4

(2004).

(2004).

Arguments for the idea that cultural identity is always a n<! necessa rily

bound u p with internal d i fferences can be fou nc! in Benhabib (2002 )
a nd Narayan ( 1 997). Draw i ng on the writings of Jose Marti, I have also
developed a heterogeneous and pl ural istic view of cultural identity
through the notion of "un ity through d iversity". See my
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(2004).
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5

For a fu l l analysis and discu ssion of th is notion, see Mu noz ( 1 999) and
my (2 003).

6

See, for example, Al coff and Mendieta (2000) and Schutte (1 993).

7

See Med ina (2 003).

8 1 n order to properly understand my fa milial account of identity, two ca
veats are in ord er. First, in my view, the notion of a family should not be
understood as a purely biological concept, but rather, as a hybrid notion
that contains social and pol itical el ements as well as biological ones.
Famil ies are not just biological groups, but social structures and l egal
in stitutions. Seco ndly, we have to keep in mind that there are all kinds
of fa mily and, therefore, only a plural istic notion of "family" ca n be use
ful for the anal ysis of col l ective identities. My Wittgensteinian approach
does not rely on the patriarchal and heterosex ist famil ial moc!el that has
been domi na nt in th e West. Far from being complacent with thi s model ,
the genealogical approach beh ind my famil ial view is i ntended to sub
vert it. In th is sense, my fam i l ial view connects with ongoing efforts in
the l iterature on identity (esp. in femin ist theory anc! queer studies) to
rearticul ate the very notion of a fa mily anc! to subvert what is typica l l y
understood by "family val ues". See my (2 003).
9

For a balanced discussion of the complex relations between the objec
tive and the intersu bjective aspects of hi story, see Alcoff (2004).
10

As I have argued in my (2 003), a l l of us have multiple fa milial identi
ties, with intersecti ng fa mily ties that are often in tension. As Gomez
Peiia (2 000) puts it, "we are al l members of multiple communities, at
d ifferent times and for different reasons. Most communities in the 90s
are fragmented, ephemeral, dysfu nctional, and insufficient. They can
only contain and 'i ncl ude' selected aspects of ou rselves." (p. 2 77)
11

This silenci ng is certainly gencler-specific. As Anzaldua notes, in the
case of Ch ica nas, the silencing of their eth nic voices co nverges with the
silencing of th ei r female voices. In th is sense she describes how she was
raised, as a woman, in a "trad ition of silence": "Ser habladora was to be
a gossip and a l iar, to tal k too much. [ . . . ] Hocicona, repelona, chismosa
[ . . ] are al l signs of being mal criada. In my cultu re they are a l l words
that are derogatory if appl ied to women-J've never heard them appl ied
to men." (p. 76) This double oppression and marginal ization as woman
and Ch icana that Anzaldua describes rem inds us that there are mu ltiple
and convergi ng fronts of oppression. The phenomenon of mu ltiple op
pression has been discussed and theorize<! by Lugones (2 003). It is also
.
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the topic of my (2003).
12

As Anzaklua points out, "there is no one Ch ica no language j u st as

there is no one Chicano experience." (p. 80) Even for a s i ngle ind ividual,
taking pride in one's tongue is typica l ly not a si ngle, u n i fied task, but a
plural ity of tasks, with mu ltiple fronts, for we speak in many tongues:
"because we are a complex, heterogeneous people, we speak many
languages." (p. 77)
1 3 In this respect some trends within l iberation theology have done very
importa nt work in ga i n i ng recogn ition and respect for the unorthodox
religious practices of oppressed classes and margi nal ized groups. See

especially Althaus-Reid (2000).
For a fu l l discussion of the plasticity of voices and their agency, see
chapters 3 and 4 of my new book (2006). Chapter 5 elaborates the
14

claims I have made in th is paragraph through a critical examination of
symbolic processes of silencing and excl usion.
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